Monday, March 29, 2010

I saw "Fight Club". Which duvet best defines me as a person?

In reading the Marcuse, I became forcibly and repeatedly reminded of the time period it was written in, moreso than almost any of our other readings, mostly because the author is discussing different economic systems and focusing on the Soviets and the Americans. Since capitalism has pretty much won this round (even in China, really), it becomes very strange to read this now.

To focus on one passage that particularly leapt out at me, “The distinguishing feature of advanced industrial society is its effective suffocation of those needs which demand liberation—liberation also from that which is tolerable and rewarding and comfortable—while it sustains and absolves the destructive power and repressive function of affluent society. Here the social controls exact the overwhelming need for the production and consumption of waste; the need for stupefying work where it is no longer a real necessity; the need for modes of relaxation which soothe and prolong this stupefication; the need for maintaining such deceptive liberties as free competition at administered prices, a free press which censors itself, free choice between brands and gadgets.” (p. 7)

In essence, yes, I agree with Marcuse that so much of what we do in modern society as workers, once one moves beyond the needs for shelter and sustenance, is work to attain material possessions and experiential purchases (vacations, etc.) that perhaps allow for those modes of relaxation previously mentioned, but also arguably expand the mind and allow for alternate perspectives on the human condition (but that depends where you go and what you do). However, it becomes extremely difficult to conceive outside the paradigm of which he speaks, not for a lack of imagination, but because this is the functional paradigm of modern affluent capitalist society and one cannot live outside the discourse.

Another argument is that people now are not so much recognizing themselves in their commodities (p. 9), but are striving instead to make connections with other people through their purchasing decisions, whether it be spending money on a laptop or a smart phone or a trip to Europe or expensive dinner. Sure, one could point out that generations before us connected fine without all these newfangled gadgets, but that argument is near petulant and willfully obtuse in the face of inexorable technological movements. These tools are here… now what do we do with them?

Perhaps at some point in the near future, we will be able to move from the illusory choices of brand and ‘leisure’ and start taking steps towards asking meaningful questions about freedom and true liberation. However, until we have made sure that people everywhere, and not just in affluent societies, are free from starvation and poverty, we aren’t really in a position to engage those other questions, I don’t think.

Tuesday, March 23, 2010

I had never really stopped to consider before this reading how intensely reassuring the concept of shadow conspiracies can be.

Seriously. A vague belief that the world is controlled by a small elite of intensely competent (though morally subjective) individuals organized to execute specific goals helps to reaffirm the concept of historical narrative that Mills explores and eventually dismisses on page 22. It permits people who have no feeling of agency to either be reassured by a sense of historical destiny or to bestow the blind faith/anger that one holds for a higher power on a group of people (whether you agree with the direction or not). It also becomes very convenient for people in power themselves to have this distraction available. “Internationally, the image of the omnipotent elite tends to prevail. All good events and pleasing happenings are quickly imputed by the opinion-makers to the leaders of their own nation; all bad events and unpleasant experiences are imputed to the enemy abroad. In both cases, the omnipotence of evil rulers or of virtuous leaders is assumed. Within the nation, the use of such rhetoric is rather more complicated; when men speak of the power of their own party or circle; they and their leaders are, of course, impotent; only ‘the people’ are omnipotent. But when they speak of the power of their opponent’s party or circle, they impute to them omnipotence; ‘the people’ are now powerlessly taken in.” (p. 17)

This public abdication of authority to appease a mass of people and put on an air of public service and humility serves many purposes. People become more trusting of leaders who are 'just like them' and don't appear to want power overtly. It also allows blame for unpopular decisions to be quickly shifted off the individual in power and preferably onto a political opponent while the people with economic and military authority continue to comfortably make policy choices that affect the lives of millions without ever having been elected. This isn't to say that issues of decision making and election are paramount here (again, something Mills covers quite handily on pg. 21), but merely to continue to highlight the distinctions between appearances of authority and accountability and actual exertion of authority without accountability.

This was, of course, a very detailed and quite fascinating reading that I would like to pick apart more. One wonders what Mills might say now that the links between the political, the military and the economic elite have grown even more complicated. One thing I did find particularly problematic (and this could just be the fact that I only have a post-military-industrial complex framework to work from) is the concept that the blurring of the political, private economic and military establishments is a relatively recent idea. How are these things not inherently related? "The decisions of the military establishment rest upon and greviously affect political life as well as the very level of economic activity. The decisions made within the political domain determine economic activities and military programs. There is no longer, on the one hand, an economy and, on the other hand, a political order containing a military establishment unimportant to politics and to money-making. There is a political economy linked, in a thousand ways with military institutions and decisions.” (p. 7-8)

When were these three things ever separate? Most definitely now when working with an international stage, super-powers and mega-corporations, the stakes are higher, but look at ancient Rome, as just one example. One cannot meaningfully separate decisions made for political expediency or gain, military supremacy or economic power (simply consider the First Triumvirate) if one is acting in the interests of a state. And if it is true that what is good for General Motors is good for the United States, and vice-versa, it logically follows that corporate influence is an inevitable outgrowth of the economic considerations of a state. Again, this is not a modern invention. The East India Company exerted enormous influence over English politics (particularly, obviously, in India, where it effectively ruled the country for a century). So what is Mills saying is the new development here? Breadth of control and involvement?

Monday, March 8, 2010

Why Your Car Runs On Gas And Can't Fly

The market demands I compete,

Apparently fair, no mean feat,

I'll absorb my opponent

(A 'free' market component)

There's no innovation! That's sweet!


One topic that seems to pervade our readings is the constant tension between ideal economic circumstances and practical economic circumstances. So much of economic theory seems defined by the former and is reluctant to engage in legitimate policy proposals based on the latter. The limited readings we did of Schumpeter illustrate this point quite handily, as he attempts to disengage from speculative conjecture on economic policy and push more aggressively to dealing with realistic policy issues. I am not entirely certain if he is successful in this endeavor—I’d have to read a lot more of his work and study a great deal more economic theory—but I do appreciate the need to engage the reality of a marketplace.

While this topic is explored in his touching on issues of socialism and unemployment, the most particular moment for me exists on page 80. “In the general case of oligopoly there is in fact no determinate equilibrium at all, and the possibility presents itself that there may be an endless sequence of moves and countermoves, an indefinite state of warfare between firms. It is true that there are many special cases in which a state of equilibrium theoretically exists. In the second place, even in these cases not only is it much harder to attain than the equilibrium in perfect competition, and still harder to preserve, but the ‘beneficial’ competition of the classic type seems likely to be replaced by ‘predatory’ or ‘cutthroat’ competition or simply by struggles for control in the financial sphere. These things are so many sources of social waste, and there are many others such as the costs of advertising campaigns, the suppression of new methods of production (buying up of patents in order not to use them) and so on. And most important of all: under the conditions envisaged, equilibrium, even if eventually attained by an extremely costly method, no longer guarantees either full employment or maximum output in the sense of the theory of perfect competition. It may exist without full employment, it is bound to exist, so it seems, at a level of output below that maximum mark, because profit-conserving strategy, impossible in the conditions of perfect competition, now not only becomes possible but imposes itself… Is it not quite true after all that there is little parallelism between producing for profit and producing for the consumer and that private enterprise is little more than a device to curtail production in order to extort profits which then are correctly described as tolls and ransoms?” (p. 79-80)

So essentially it seems that if perfect competition actually existed (it doesn’t), then the larger macroeconomic goals of the market would be perfectly in line (equilibrium) with the consumer and all would prosper. However, as Schumpeter attests here, actual competition involves undercutting competition and squashing innovation in order to preserve pre-existing profits, minimize workforce while increasing prices, prevent sustainable opposition and encourage government involvement that reinforces corporate interests while remaining resistant to leveling playing fields. How is that compatible with the overall economic progress and innovation necessary for a large economic entity (whether multinational corporation or state) to function within a global marketplace, particularly one with socialized or semi-socialized businesses? Simply put, in the long run, it isn’t, and this methodology stunts the potential growth of the industry and participants while continuing to marginalize the average consumer/wage laborer.

What bewilders me, and always has, is how corporations seem to prefer squashing innovation rather than co-opting it. If Ford and Exxon had teamed up to offer electric cars that ran on clean sustainable energy sources right now, they would dominate the global market, guaranteeing profits the likes of which they’d never seen, and creating a sustainable business model to take them into the next hundred years. Instead we see the death of the electric car and the beginning tentative industrial explorations of renewable energy sources by organizations that lack the capital to do the R&D necessary to innovate effectively.

I digress too far from the text now, but not the spirit, I think. Schumpeter also says, “The capitalist achievement does not typically consist in providing more silk stockings for queens but in bringing them within the reach of factory girls in return for steadily decreasing amounts of effort.” (p. 67) In that vein, entrenched industries would only seem to stand to gain from embracing innovation, but perhaps this is the same idealistic trap that many economists fall prey to when studying theory rather than practice.

Monday, March 1, 2010

One should never listen to the French about anything but cheese and wine...

The policies of laissez-faire
With which we've had a torrid affair
To resist regulation
Seems quite a temptation
You say "Yes!", we say "Au contraire!"



I love economic readings. I really can't help it. The politics of money are absolutely fascinating and Polanyi's approach is refreshing and very clear. This is why it was so difficult for me to pick solitary points of this reading to focus on. It is with great difficulty that I am going to select one passage to comment on and refrain from expounding at the length I would like to.

“Theoretically, laissez-faire or freedom of contract implied the freedom of workers to withhold their labor either individually or jointly, if they so decided; it implied also the freedom of businessmen to concert on selling prices irrespective of the wishes of the consumers. But in practice, such freedom conflicted with the institution of a self-regulating market, and in such a conflict, the self-regulating market was invariably accorded precedence. In other words, if the needs of a self-regulating market proved incompatible with the demands of laissez-faire, the economic liberal turned against laissez-faire and preferred—as any antiliberal would have done—the so-called collectivist method of regulation and restriction. Trade union law as well as anti-trust legislation sprang from this attitude. No more conclusive proof could be offered of the inevitability of anti-liberal or ‘collectivist’ methods under the conditions of modern industrial society than the fact that even economic liberals themselves regularly used such methods in decisively important fields of industrial organization,” (p. 155)

It is very difficult in modern America to consider the concept of true laissez-faire market policies seriously. Sure, at its most basic level, a market has a self-regulating aspect... supply and demand, cost determination, wage determination, etc, but the moment that one starts concentrating wealth in the hands of the few, the actual self-regulation becomes somewhat difficult. One need only look at early attempts at union movements and collective organizing on the part of workers to see how difficult it is for workers to demand higher wages in concert without the backing of some sort of government authority. Laissez-faire is a fantastic idea... if you already have control of wealth and the means of production. It is for this reason that listening to modern neo-conservative millionaires espouse laissez-faire policies that systematically strip government oversight from large corporations while increasing taxation on small businesses that it is difficult to see the theory as anything other than a cynical means of power consolidation.

But that's viewed through the lens of a modern, heavily regulated economy, where regulations for the sake of societal good [attempts at equal wage regardless of sex or race; elimination of child labor; control of unsafe work conditions] are taken as a matter of course. Naturally the government would regulate these things... where is the incentive for private companies to do it on their own? It reduces their profit margin and surely not every employee is so skilled (nor every company so altruistic) that the companies would voluntarily take on greater cost to incentivize and attract top talent.

So the real question here for me (and the one that Polanyi didn't engage because he was busy refusing laissez-faire theory) is: On what basis did proponents of laissez-faire theory believe that for-profit organizations would self-regulate for a common good? Would markets as a whole try to resolve themselves for the greatest possible good? Yes, I can see how that might work... at a certain point companies have to raise wages or lower costs to make their products/services appealing and competitive to the greatest possible audience and so self-regulation occurs, but independent entities, especially ones at the megacorporation level don't have to consider safe working conditions, for example, when there is little reason (gov't regulation) to make them think about it, even if safe workplaces are in the best interest of society at large.

A related thought:

Perhaps the closest thing to a modern functional self-regulating market is eBay. Prices are determined through a fairly transparent process of auction, mutual agreement between willingness to sell and willingness to buy and the ability to compare values is transparent and instantaneous. People who do not adhere to the community-determined rules (timely payment, authentic representation of goods, etc.) are reported, penalized and eventually banned, and providing feedback is a mandatory part of market exchange. However, even that community has standards, fraud prevention, restricted payment methods and oversight, both of a private corporation (eBay itself) and the global economies that it is a part of.

By adhering to laissez-faire policies in their illogical but literal extreme, you overvalue independent action to such an extent that you remove our strongest supports-- each other-- and in the end, there is no market, self-regulating or otherwise, without people.